About the author(s):
Leon Seidl is a Ph.D. candidate at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Anne Peters. His research focuses on the intersection of peacebuilding, peace agreements and international economic law, as well as the law of the World Trade Organization. He has studied law with a focus on public international law at the University of Heidelberg and the University of Geneva. He has also previously worked as an intern in the Economic Research and Statistics Division of the WTO in Geneva.
Over half a year after the ousting of Syrian dictator Bashar Al-Assad, the Syrian transition continues to hang in the balance. President Ahmed al-Sharaa appears to have successfully asserted his control for the time being by proclaiming an interim constitution and announcing the formation of a transitional cabinet in March. At the same time, attacks on civilians in the western regions by government aligned forces in April, as well as clashes between Druze militias, Bedouins and government forces in Suweida governorate in July have served as stark reminders that the Syrian civil war is far from fully pacified. Throughout this, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have maintained their autonomy while taking tentative steps of rapprochement with the transitional government. Given the strategic importance and rich water and hydrocarbon resources of the territory under SDF control, their role in the transition is crucial for its success. The SDF has so far proven an anchor of stability in Syria and displayed an attention to human rights issues well beyond that of most other Syrian actors. The continuing peace process may thus see it serving as a counterweight to the transitional government’s more authoritarian impulses, ensuring that the latter actually abides by its commitments to human rights and democratic governance.
This contribution takes the recent deterioration of relations between the SDF and transitional government as an opportunity to assess the role of the SDF in the Syrian peace process. Based on the peace process, in particular the agreement reached in March, and the ideology of and public positions taken by the SDF, it argues that the group acts as a promoter of human rights in Syria in relation to the transitional government.
The Syrian Democratic Forces
Controlling large parts of the country’s North-East, known as the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), the SDF are the second-most important domestic actor in Syria after the transitional government itself, based on their territorial control and military capabilities. The alliance consists of several armed groups of different ethnic affiliations, but is controlled largely by the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG). During the fight against Da’esh, the SDF were a key ally of the international coalition and they maintain military ties to the United States. Following the defeat of the caliphate, they now control most of the detention camps in which former Da’esh militants are held. At the same time, the SDF has come under military pressure from Türkiye and its allies in Syria, which consider it a threat due to its ties to the Turkish Kurds and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, PKK). Since the fall of the Assad Regime, the SDF, led by their commander-in-chief Mazloum Abdi, have been in talks with the new transitional government. However, recently, the transitional government announced it would not participate in a planned round of talks in Paris, dealing a blow to the process.
The Syrian Transition and Constitutional Declaration
The primary focus of Damascus in the post-Assad period has been the drafting of a new interim constitution. In February, President Al-Sharaa called a National Dialogue conference with hundreds of participants from all over Syria to discuss how such a constitution should be drafted. The result was the Constitutional Declaration proclaimed on 13 March 2025. Constitutional reforms are not unusual in peace processes, up to and including a complete constitutional overhaul. Such reforms can be an effective way to unite a fractured country around a new political system and social contract. As a matter of fact, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2254 called for just such an exercise in Syria already in 2015.
However, the process has not been without controversy, with accusations of excessive control by Al-Sharaa and his allies and concerns over inclusiveness. Most importantly, the SDF was not invited to the National Dialogue conference, as it refused to integrate into the new Syrian army. Accordingly, the discussions concerning their territories were held in Damascus, rather than locally. As a result, the SDF has rejected both the conference itself and the constitutional declaration. This in rejection is not particularly surprising, of course, given they had no stake in the process. What is, however, is that the SDF has partially justified this rejection by explicitly citing concerns over the transitional government’s human rights record. The alliance argues that Syria should be governed in a decentralized democratic manner, respect political and other rights, and ensure transitional justice. This echoes concerns voiced by international observers (here and here). These concerns are also congruent with the groups socialist ideals of “democratic confederationalism”, suggesting they are more than empty rhetoric.
International Law and the Rapprochement Between the SDF and Transitional Government
As an ideology, democratic confederationalism is founded on communalism, decentralised local democracy, anti-hierarchical thought and gender equality. As such, it stands in stark contrast to the transitional government’s ideals of centralisation and Islamist social values, and is better placed to ensure the human rights of minorities and women as well as meaningful democracy. In practice, this has been translated into a Social Contract (comparable to a constitution) that directly incorporates international human rights and forms the basis for a vibrant – albeit imperfect – council democracy based on direct participation and gender parity. The effects of this can be seen in the most recent report of the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria before the fall of Assad, in which the accusations against the SDF of unlawful detentions and sporadic child recruitment pale in comparison to targeted attacks on civilians by the old Assad Government, extrajudicial executions by Al Sharaa’s Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham, or systematic torture by the Syrian National Army. This is not to say that the SDF has a spotless human rights record. In particular, it has faced harsh criticism for its handling of detainees and displaced persons in the ongoing fight against Da’esh, which Amnesty International has described as amounting to war crimes. Yet even here, the SDF has shown a willingness to engage with international human rights actors. On the recruitment of children, meanwhile, the SDF has repeatedly worked with the international community to alleviate concerns and taken steps to eliminate the practice and discharge already recruited children. On the whole, their record inspires significantly more confidence than that of the transitional government.
From the perspective of international law, in particular human rights law and transitional justice, this is an interesting development. Ordinarily, international law regards non-state armed groups with a degree of suspicion (Spadaro 2023). By their very existence, these groups challenge the state’s monopoly of force and thus the sovereignty that international law rests on. While modern international law acknowledges their relevance, they are usually perceived as either potential threats to human rights and international humanitarian law (IHL), or as outright criminal. However, the SDF is not only unusual in its human rights record. Despite Western perceptions to the contrary, its Kurdish parts around the YPG also do not seek formal independence from Syria, but rather autonomy within a united Syria.
The SDF thus finds itself in an odd role for an armed group. While non-state armed groups do at times accuse governments of violating international law as part of their efforts to sway public opinion, it is rather unusual that they can claim genuine legitimacy in doing so. While the human rights record of the SDF is far from a shining example, compared to the other factions of the Syrian civil war, it has been unusually committed to at least improve its record. Thus, the SDF may act as a promoter of human rights vis-à-vis the government. This aspect of the role of non-state armed groups in human rights promotion remains underexplored in the literature, which largely focuses on such groups own obligations under international law (e.g. here and here).
The Agreement between the SDF and transitional government, concluded on 10 March 2025, demonstrates the norm-promoting role of the SDF. The legal nature of this agreement, like for all intra-state peace agreements, is a complicated issue. Assuming that the SDF as a non-state armed group would in principle be capable of signing an agreement that qualifies as international law, two questions present themselves: Is the agreement legal in nature? And if it is, does it form part of international law, rather than another normative system such as Syrian municipal law?
To answer the first question, the Agreement must be interpreted so as to ascertain the intention of the parties, based on its wording, structure, and content. The Agreement is rather to the point, consisting of a mere eight provisions. It lacks the usual trappings of a treaty, such as a preamble, articles, or an entry-into-force clause. Finally, it merely states that the ‘executive committees will work and strive to implement’ it, a wording that strongly suggests a political rather than legal commitment (although it should be noted that this is a translation of the original Arabic which limits the accuracy of the textual interpretation). Similar doubts are warranted regarding the Agreement’s international nature. As mentioned, the SDF does not consider itself a secessionist movement, nor does it claim sovereignty for North-Eastern Syria. As the Agreement itself is silent on the issue, one can assume that it is not intended to claim international character.
Ultimately, however, the legal nature of the Agreement is of secondary importance. Doctrinal discussions aside, it still constitutes a firm commitment by both parties. What matters is the content of this commitment. The Agreement affirms both the rights of all Syrians to participate in the political process (Point 1) as well as the constitutional rights of the Kurds as an indigenous community of Syria (Point 2). It is also clearly committed to the integrity and unity of the Syrian state (Point 6 and 7). At the same time, the SDF appears to have been conscious to maintain some distance between itself and the government. While it has committed to integrating its civil and military institutions into the Syrian state (Point 4), there is considerable constructive ambiguity to this commitment. In particular, it will still need to be negotiated whether the SDF will fully integrate into the Syrian army or maintain its own structures under the army’s umbrella. Thus, the SDF has succeeded in securing some commitments to human rights from the government while maintaining the leverage necessary to ensure they are actually implemented by delaying military and territorial integration. These commitments may most likely be political rather than legal, but as long as the SDF is committed to insisting upon them, this makes no difference.
Conclusion: Quo vadis, SDF?
Since March, relations between the transitional government and the SDF have soured considerably, culminating in the cancellation of the envisioned negotiations in Paris by Damascus. Nevertheless, the leadership of the peoples of the AANES has continued to call on the government to ensure the equality of all groups in Syria, participatory democracy, and social justice. It has also demanded an investigation into the clashes in Suweida, decrying them as crimes against humanity. If the AANES and SDF can stay this course, they may emerge as strong promoters of human rights in the Syrian Transition.