About the author(s):
Sarah is a community fellow at York University’s Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research and an independent consultant, with an interest in the practice and politics of protecting civilians and displaced populations in violent conflict settings.
She is an international lawyer with a specialisation in human rights and humanitarian law and a trained researcher. Sarah graduated in 2025 with a research LLM from Osgoode Hall Law School at York University in Canada and has a previous international relations MA degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in the United States. Prior to academia, Sarah worked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with progressive seniority as a Protection Expert for over a twelve years plus, as well as with various NGOs such as, Oxfam and Pearson Peace-keeping centre. Sarah’s early career was short stints with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC).
Sarah has worked in various contexts, including, Afghanistan, Kenya, Libya, Myanmar, Somalia (also covering Yemen situation) and Syria. She has also worked at headquarters in the Global Protection Cluster with a global context remit including, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Palestinian Territories, DRC, Haiti, Ukraine and the Philippines.
This post forms part of phase two of the Beyond Compliance Symposium: How to Prevent Harm and Need in Conflict, hosted by the Armed Groups and International Law blog. The introductory post can be found here. The symposium invites reflection on the conceptualisation of negative everyday lived experiences of armed conflict, and legal and extra-legal strategies that can effectively address both civilian harm and humanitarian need.
Introduction
The Beyond Compliance Consortium proposes “full(er) protection”, echoing the 2024 call by the UN Secretary General “for protection of civilians agenda is to have meaning for all civilians affected by conflict, it is essential to work towards the full protection of civilians”. This proposal of “fuller protection” coupled with a harm+need lens to protection in conflict, I contend, fills existing gaps in how the orthodox displacement framework (‘the framework’) deals with the harm of displacement.
In this blog, I lay out two arguments demonstrating the current limits of the orthodox displacement framework. Onethere is limited accountability and responsibility for the various kinds of harm of displacement; and two, the framework is not fit for purpose to protect all individuals and communities in the reality of displacement in situations of conflict, ranging from situations of generalised violence to high intensity conflict. I conclude by arguing that there is an imperative to move towards fuller protection with a harm+need lens, for effective prevention and curtailment of the harm of displacement.
First, some definitions employed in this blog: the harm of displacement is the “injury” of being coerced to leave and abandon one’s home and one’s wider community and one’s normal life, against one’s will, due to violence or threat of violence. The harm is at the point of “coerced to leave”, although disruption of life that proceeds must be noted. The individuals impacted may remain within the borders of their country as internally displaced persons or flee across borders to another country in order to seek asylum, as refugees. Thus, displacement conveys an entire cycle of being coerced to leave, leaving and being on the move, finding a refuge and ending their state of displacement by finding a durable solution.
I employ the “injury language” purposefully in order not to foreground the legalism of rights but to urge examination of this harm through the various lenses of ethics, politics, war strategy, rights frameworks and actual lived experience of those impacted. Moreover, this language captures the nature of displacement in conflict which is rarely an individual being affected but rather groups of people. Arguably, the “language of rights” does not always encompass this, as “a right” rests primarily with individualism in dominant discourses of international law, encapsulated in Human Rights and Refugee Law and to a lesser extent in International Humanitarian law (IHL), which form the basis of for example of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 1998.
The orthodox displacement framework is defined as a dominant framework consisting of laws (including, international humanitarian law, human rights law and refugee law), policies and practices and dynamic dialogue vis-à-vis zones of crisis, primarily within the international community including states, international organisations and others. The dynamic dialogues often contribute to enhancing the gravity of the harm of displacement or undermining the attention to it at a given moment in time. For example, the current focus on security and migration and increasing xenophobia potentially could result in de-prioritising attention to gravity of the harm of displacement, by conflating these two issues together.
Notwithstanding the normal resonances associated with the term “orthodox”, I conceptualise this orthodox framework as both protean and rigid. It is employed by actors operating from global to local levels and to a certain extent within affected populations. It is both an analytical and justificatory framework, in that actors deploy it in constructing their particular mode of engagement, non-engagement and moral positioning.
The orthodox displacement framework: Limited Accountability and Responsibility
The framework, while stipulating that no individual can be forced to move against their will, allows for the harm of displacement to occur. It does so by carving out a distinction between displacement that is “unacceptable” but not always “unlawful”, and criminalising only some forcible displacement acts.
The clearest and strongest prohibition vis-à-vis the harm of displacement is found in IHL with “forced displacement”. This is stipulated in treaty law and is criminalised in international law as “war crimes” (Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(b)(viii) for international armed conflicts and Article 8(2)(b)(viii) for non-international armed conflicts). While displacement may occur in the context of Genocide there is only an explicit prohibition of transfer of children (Article 6(e) of the Genocide Convention) and international courts have set a high standard requiring that the only reasonable inference from acts constituting genocide is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, the members of the group. Under the International Criminal Court Statute, deportation or forcible transfer of population constitutes a crime against humanity (Article 7(1)(d)), when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. Nevertheless, lawful displacement is permitted including, “evacuations”.
International human rights law does not have an explicit prohibition on forcible displacement, although some rights could be interpreted to imply the right against forcible displacement for example, the right to freedom of movement (Art. 13 of UDHR; Art. 12 of ICCPR; Art. 5(d)(i) and (f) of ICERD; Art. 15(4) of CEDAW; at the regional level, Art. 12 AfCHPR; Art. 22 of AmCHR; and Art. 2 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR). The only human rights treaty that contains an explicit prohibition is the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169). Refugee law too, does not have an explicit prohibitionary stance, given its interest on access to asylum.
The only global instrument addressing internal displacement, covering the majority of the forcibly displaced persons in contemporary crises, is the non-binding Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (‘the principles’). The principles prohibit forcible displacement and encourage prevention and ending of displacement as soon as possible. They innovate beyond IHL to cover situations of ‘arbitrary displacement’, due to generalised violence, as well as, natural and man-made disasters. The principles have been increasingly adopted into national level policies and practices however, accountability and criminalisation is subject to relevant authorities’ discretion. The only treaty on displacement is the Kampala Convention, which spells out the responsibility and accountability of states for the African Continent. It requires signatory states to “make offences punishable by (international criminal law) law” that is, forced displacement from war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. Yet, it leaves the criminalisation of other individual acts of arbitrary displacement to the discretion of signatory states.
Given the uneven accountability and criminalisation across the framework, James Simeon calls for criminalising all acts of displacement. This could provide ‘a prohibitionary line’ for clear responsibility and accountability for all kinds of harm of displacement, if not serving as well a deterrent function.
Continuum of displacement: Challenging the Orthodox displacement framework
The continuum of displacement (‘the continuum’) provides a typology of various kinds of harm of displacement that can occur in situations of conflict, threat of conflict and in the aftermath of conflict. I illustrate here with examples from the post 9/11 wars of displacement, some of the variance of the framework vis-a-vis the continuum.
The occurrence of voluntary displacement (or preventative flight) prior to out-break of conflict in an area or in an adjacent area has been viewed as a self-protection mechanism, although it is anything but voluntary. A slight shift in embracing this self-protection mechanism readily appears to be underway, as Centre for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) urges, “[s]tates should endeavour to prevent voluntary displacement (preventative flight) by civilians as a means of self-protection from the adverse consequences of armed violence” by adhering to IHL and human rights law. This type of movement occurs often in conflict, for example in Libya, where it was fuelled by disinformation of imminent sexual violence and in Afghanistan it was out of fear of conflict – irrespective of whether the individuals and communities in an area were actually impacted by it. A 2012 data report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees notes that “In the West (of Afghanistan) particularly, a significant portion of the displacement is based on the notion of ‘preventative flight’ in anticipation of persecution. This form of displacement is one of the most difficult to track, as the flight often occurs in the form of individuals or families leaving (trickling out), rather than group movement.”
The last decade has witnessed huge strides in data collection, by humanitarian actors, World Bank, etc., yet, there continues to be differing levels of data collected among various actors in crisis zones; some more granular than others, with different aims and understanding. While accurate data does contribute to better ‘human intelligence’ and helps to fully understand the story of displacement, the inherent unpredictability of movement of human beings means that data and other human intelligence will always have limitations, even with infinite resources.
Such pre-emptive movements may fall outside both categories of ‘forced displacement’ or even ‘arbitrary displacement’ in certain situations. They also pose a challenge during on-going confictin terms of deciphering ‘lawful’ and ‘unlawful’ displacement.
In Iraq, some displacement occurred due to a “coercive environment”, under what Ali Ali explains as a phenomenon of displacement in-situ, as opposed to immediate physical mobility. The eventual involuntary movement is not even connected to direct hostilities or threat of the same, but based on a build-up over time of a coercive environment consisting of myriad factors from limited services to everyday violence. This situation may defy the causal link of violence that forcible displacement rests on.
Post hostilities displacement could be covered under the concept of ‘reverberating effects’, with a feasible cause and effect correlation, such as displacement in Yemen, resulting from post conflict trauma or failing health care or lack of livelihoods. However, the concept continues to be contested in terms of accountability and responsibility of parties to hostilities. This reality is coupled with the unpredictability of people’s choices and military operations assumptions – for example, during the Mosul campaign in Iraq when large scale military operations were conducted on the assumption that civilians would remain in the vicinity.
In the Raqqa campaign in Syria, which occurred prior to Mosul, no formal evacuation corridors were mooted despite urging by humanitarian actors, although the coalition did urge civilians to leave the city. During the military operations, Roy Gutman describes in real time how the US military forces appeared to have a blind spot on the harm of displacement they were helping to create, leading to prolonged displacement for many. The almost yearlong offensive led to a total of 300,000 people being displaced and caused large-scale destruction, almost emptying the city. While some returns did occur despite heavy destruction post the fighting, until 2020, over 50% of Raqqa’s residents remained displaced due to the Raqqa campaign and the broader Syrian civil war.
During hostilities, the harm of displacement could be under-estimated in target identification and calculation. The targeting methodology based on legalistic considerations of necessity, proportionality, distinction and precaution is generally centered on individual attacks, so it is relatively easy to pinpoint and predict estimates of numbers of civilians harmed in the immediate vicinity, that is deaths and injuries. Although now there is an emerging and much needed discussion regarding the principle of proportionality and cumulative harm, these discussions are centered on deaths and injuries while an examination of displacement is absent.
Moreover, there is a permissibility within the framework to accept the harm of displacement as being an unfortunate yet legally acceptable harm as ‘collateral damage’. Jovana Davidovic argues that lethal harm, death and injury are given paramountcy over displacement in law and applied thus by military practitioners when assessing collateral damage.
Even if there is an earnest attempt to account for the harm of displacement, there is a challenge of “quantification” of civilian harm with respect to forcible displacement. This issue emerged in interviews I conducted in my graduate research vis-à-vis the work of the lodestar civilian casualty tracking mechanism developed by NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. While acknowledging the stellar work done to minimise civilian casualties through this mechanism, ISAF’s approach to civilian harm largely centred on quantifiable metrics, particularly, deaths and injuries. As a result, much of the international community’s engagement with ISAF is also centred on dissecting these figures. This perhaps may have been to the detriment of vigorously pressing for restraint and more feasible precautions, as ISAF was not focusing on preventing or minimising an unpredictable harm like displacement, which does not neatly correlate to a targeting calculation and “quantification” of outcome.
My ringside view of this situation in Afghanistan showed that patterns of movement did not always correspond to where the actual fighting occurred. People did not necessarily move in direct response to events such as airstrikes, which made it difficult to capture displacement as a clearly attributable form of civilian harm within tracking systems. Nonetheless, displacement driven by conflict and insecurity was consistently documented and reported in the UN Mission in Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) well-regarded Protection of Civilians Reports.
Conclusion: Towards full(er) protection against the harm of displacement
In this blog we noted that “forced displacement” under IHL, with the strongest accountability and responsibility demands in law does not cover all the various forcible movements on the displacement continuum such as, displacement prior and well after conflict. These gaps in acknowledgement of the harm, accountability and responsibility within the orthodox displacement framework provides strong grounds for an embrace of a full(er) protection lens using a harm+need lens. By this, I mean moving beyond mere legal compliance and binary distinctions such as “lawful” and “unlawful”, towards restraint that takes the prohibition of the harm of displacement as its goal. This approach aims to prevent or end displacement as soon as it occurs by understanding the harm from the perspective of the lived experience of communities.
An example of how this could be done is by examining the urban conflicts of our time, Gaza, Ukraine or Sudan and asking whether prolonged mass displacement caused by the complete destruction of entire environments and ways of life of a community is a worthwhile war fighting strategy at all for the belligerents. Such strategies may yield short-term military gains, but they carry significant long-term costs, including depleted economic capacity in the area post conflict and/or resentment that can cause another round of violence and unstable, costly peace. This takes us beyond applying “protection of civilians” as a means to improve military operational capability, which shaped doctrine in the post 9/11 contexts like Afghanistan (see here for NATO’s POC Policy).
One way to engage with the complexity of displacement could be by applying a human security lens to engaging with displacement when planning military operations. This approach centres people’s security and needs across both conflict and post-conflict contexts, and better captures displacement as a continuum of harm rather than a single event. It moves beyond treating displacement as an unfortunate but acceptable by-product of conflict, and instead suggests engaging with it as an absolute prohibition.