About the author(s):
Professor Martha M. Bradley holds an LLB (Bachelors of Law), LLM (Masters of Law in Air, Space and Telecommunications Law), LLD (Doctors of Law) from University of Pretoria and an LLM (Masters of Shipping Law) from the University of Cape Town. She is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Law at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa, and an associated researcher with the NRF South African Research Chair in International Law.
Martha teaches in the Advanced IHL Course at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo. She serves on the Editorial Advisory Board of the Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law and has been a Land Steiermark Fellow at the University of Graz (2023) and a Stellenbosch Institute for Advanced Study Iso Lomso Fellow (from 2026). She is also an alumni of the South African Government’s Future Professors Program, Phase 2 Cohort 1. She previously served as an external expert on the Common African Position on international law and cyberspace.
Martha is responsible for the classification of armed conflicts under the IHL in Focus and WarWatch projects at the Geneva Academy.
The Tadic formulation for the existence of a non-international armed conflict is two-fold. First, the notion of organisation, which requires the military wing of a non-state actor, which is party to a conflict, to meet the demand to display a minimum degree of organisation. Second, the notion of intensity, which asserts that the severity of the fighting between parties to the conflict must equate to protracted armed violence. Both these elements must be fulfilled. A situation crosses over from a law enforcement paradigm into the realm of the law of non-international armed conflict only once the Tadic threshold is met.
Much attention is paid to when the threshold inherent in the Tadic criteria in met, in other words, when a NIAC begins, as opposed to when an existing NIAC is extinguished or, simply put, when such a NIAC ends. It is therefore refreshing to see that Nathan Derejko’s monograph, Identifying Non-International Armed Conflict: International Law and Practice, grapples with both sides of the ‘temporal’ coin concerning NIACs. Derejko masterfully unpacks three scenarios that could lead to the end of NIACs and the termination of the hostilities regimes: peace agreements, victory and defeat on the battlefield, and the terminal decline of a non-state party to an existing NIAC.
This contribution explores the third scenario proposed by Derejko concerning the assessment of the end of a NIAC, coined ‘the terminal decline of a non-state party to an existing NIAC’ (p.311). It compares Derejko’s approach to the ICRC’s approach, that was first set out in its 2024 Opinion Paper and now has been included in its 2025 commentary to common Article 3, through a case study of the NIAC between the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) non-formés and the Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) in Central African Republic (CAR).
This post is structured in four parts following this introduction. First, it provides some background information of the NIAC between the AAKG non-formés and the UPC in CAR. Second, it applies the ICRC’s approach to determining when a conflict ends to the case study. Third, it tests Derejko’s ‘terminal decline’-theory against the case study. Finally, it offers closing remarks.
Background: the NIAC between AAKG non-formés and the UPC in Central African Republic
The Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AAKG) is an armed group that claims its existence serves to protect the Azande people, who have endured atrocities committed by the Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic UPCand the Lords’ Resistance Army for many years. Most Azande live in the Mbomou and Haut-Mbomou prefectures in CAR. Since at least 2023, AAKG and the UPC have been engaged in a NIAC in the Central African Republic (CAR).
Plans to incorporate parts of the AAKG into FACA as WTA began in early 2024. During 2024, approximately 500 AAKG fighters were integrated into the armed forces of the CAR i.e. Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA). Originally, the AAKG consisted of more than 1,000 fighters. Therefore, it is evident that not all AAKG fighters were integrated into FACA. The other fighters continue operating under the AAKG moniker and are now called “AAKG non-formés” by the local population, meaning ‘the non-trained AAKG’. They were given this name because they did not undergo training by FACA or the Wagner Group, as opposed to the AAKG fighters integrated into FACA, which are referred to as ‘Wagner Ti Azande’ (WTA).
During mid-2024, some, but not all, members of the AAKG were incorporated into FACA structures. On 6 May 2025, the first group of AAKG fighters was formally integrated into FACA by the CAR Ministry of Defense and the Restructuring of the Army as ‘soldat[s] de 2eme classe’ in a ‘Battalion Hors Rang’ for a period of three years through the ‘Decision regarding the incorporation of young recruits into the Central African Armed Forces’. Former AAKG fighters, who have been incorporated into FACA structures, that earn a salary as members of FACA, wear FACA uniforms, and use FACA weaponry, are, according to the Ministry of Defence decision dated 6 May 2025, officially members of the CAR armed forces. These so-called WTA, or AAKG formés, elements were trained by FACA or its Russian support elements to continue combat against the UPC and other opposition forces. In mid-2024, all five senior AAKG commanders, who previously comprised the core AAKG leadership, were integrated into FACA. The AAKG was therefore not fully demobilised by the integration of some of its fighters into FACA. The AAKG non-formés continued fighting under the AAKG moniker. As of late 2025, AKKG non-formés militia leaders claimed to have more than 5,000 fighters under their command.
However, after their integration into FACA, tensions arose between FACA and WTA, as numerous integrated fighters disobeyed their commanders’ instructions. This led to the cancellation of a third round of training for the integrated AAKG fighters in August 2024, thereby effectively halting the integration of AAKG fighters into FACA. In the aftermath of the halted integration process, FACA succeeded in disarming about 100 AKKG formés fighters. The rest, reportedly about 100 AAKG fighters who were initially integrated into FACA’s WTA unit, hung onto their weapons and returned to the bush (as ex-WTA) to join the AAKG’s fight against FACA and their Russian support elements, which was an indication that their integration did not last. As of late 2025, a mere ten AAKG formés fighters remained integrated into FACA.
Fighting between the AAKG and the UPC remained protracted in nature until the integration of a part of the AAKG fighters into FACA forces. There has been a lull in fighting between the AAKG and the UPC since July 2024, but, according to the ICRC, this does not necessarily equate to the end of a NIAC.
Applying the ICRC criteria for the End of a NIAC
For a NIAC to end, the ICRC has determined that one of two requirements must be satisfied. First, one of the parties to the NIAC ceases to exist, for example, the non-State actor is completely defeated or demobilised. This is a very high threshold set by the ICRC, as demobilisation of the majority of a non-state actor may not meet this requirement. This means that, if remnants of the organised armed group remain active, the conflict may still be ongoing. According to the facts, despite the integration of about 500 fighters into FACA during 2024, the AAKG did not cease to exist because a large percentage of fighters remained part of the AAKG ‘non-formés’ military wing. Following the ICRCs approach, the first requirement for the conflict between the AAKG and UPC to end has not been satisfied.
According to the ICRC, the second situation in which a NIAC comes to an end is if there is a lasting cessation of fighting without any real risk of resumption. A lull in fighting does not equate to no real risk of resumption. The lull in fighting between the AAKG and the UPC can partially be attributed to the integration of some AAKG members into FACA during 2024 or possibly under reporting. Additionally, since April 2025, the AAKG has focused its efforts on fighting FACA and the Wagner Group, instead of the UPC, taking up most of its combat capacity. Despite the almost two years pause in direct fighting between the AAKG and the UPC, whether or not the criteria of ‘lasting cessation’ has been met seems uncertain. It is unclear if a two-year period is sufficient. Additionally, on top of ‘lasting cessation’, the ICRC requires that no real risk of resumption exists. This criterion will rarely be met in practice where the root of the conflict is not sufficiently addressed, and victims or parties are dissatisfied with how the conflict ‘ended’. This conflict is a result of the atrocities endured by the Azande people at the hands of the UPC. Victims are yet to receive satisfactory reparations. Despite the lull in direct fighting between the AAKG and the UPC, the AAKG, supported by ex-WTA fighters, has, nevertheless, continued to target Fulani civilians over their suspected association with the UPC during the reporting period. Therefore, a risk of resumption remains, thus, the second criterion is not met. At time of writing, following the ICRC’s approach, the NIAC between the AAKG and the UPC remains ongoing.
Derejko’s functional approach to the end of a NIAC
‘As the activation of IHL in the first instance is contingent upon an armed group’s ability to engage’ in NIAC, systematically reducing this ability will invariably result in the gradual reduction of hostilities to a point that warrants the termination of the hostilities regime.’
Derejko identifies that the terminal decline of a non-state armed group, that is party to a NIAC, comes when that organised armed group can no longer engage in fighting. It is at this point that the NIAC comes to an end. This logically corresponds to the beginning of a NIAC, as set out in the Tadic formulation, which provides that, for a non-state actor to satisfy the organisation criteria and become a party to a NIAC, it must first be able to engage in military operations that generate protracted armed violence and have the ability to implement IHL. Simply put, once the organisational criteria has collapsed or has been dismantled to the extent that the armed group can no longer ‘engage in the NIAC’, the NIAC has ended. Derejko explains that a non-state armed group’s ability to engage can be deprived through limiting the means and methods employed in pursuit of fighting the enemy or by dismantling its organisational structure of its military wing specifically. This differs from the ICRC’s ‘absolutist’ approach which demands that the non-state party to the armed conflict no longer exists or that disarmament was sufficiently extensive that the organisational structure no longer satisfies the minimum threshold.
As discussed above, during mid-2024, some, but not all, members of the AAKG were incorporated into FACA structures as part of a disarmament process. What is significant is that, in mid-2024, all five senior AAKG commanders who previously comprised the AAKG’s core leadership, were integrated into FACA. It is fair to assume, considering that fighting stopped as early as mid-2025, that this is a direct result of the dismantling of AAKG’s organisational structure, through the disarmament process. While disarmament does not always result in declassification, the AAKG’s disarmament has led to the group’s inability to engage in the NIAC. The ability of the AAKG supported by ex-WTA fighters to target Fulani civilians differs from the organisational structure required to execute military operations and it not evidence that its organisational criteria remains in tact. Following Derejko’s functional approach the NIAC between the UPC and the remnants of the former AAKG has ended. This, in my view, Derejko’sfunctional approach leads to the correct conclusion as it aligns with the Tadic criterion determining the start of a NIAC.
Concluding remarks
Derejko’s functional approach is preferred over that of the ICRC’s which is overly conservative. Of course, the ICRC’s protective mandate, which informs its approach, is appreciated. However, I personally prefer Derejko’s approach as it is, in my view, better situated to respond to situations which clearly no longer meet the Tadic criterion. Employing Derejko’s functional approach will certainly lead to the declassification of some conflicts, namely, the armed conflict between Syria and the Syrian Democratic Forces, which, according to the functional approach, ended around the end of February 2026 and the armed conflict between Egypt and the Islamic State Sinai Province. The ICRC’s approach does not lead to the same conclusion. In my view, both aforementioned conflicts have clearly ended, and Derejko’s approach supports that conclusion.
Derejko’s functional approach is realistic, practical and functional. It directly corresponds to the point at which one of the two Tadic criteria is no longer met. In my view, this is the logical deduction for determining when a NIAC ends, excluding temporary pauses in intensity which clearly do not declassify protracted armed violence. The clarity offered by Derejko’s monograph regarding when NIACs should be declassified does not only offer theoretical value, but it is practical, user-friendly and adds legal certainty to those tasked with conflict classification.