About the author(s):
Marta Furlan is Senior Program Manager for Research at Free the Slaves, an international human rights organization. She is also a non-resident Fellow at the Center on Armed Groups and the Orion Policy Institute. Marta holds a PhD in International Relations from the University of St Andrews, where she studied governance by Salafi-Jihadist armed groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Her publications have appeared in the Journal of Human Rights Practice, The Middle East Journal, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, and Civil Wars and she has contributed chapters to four edited volumes.
Omar Ahmed Abenza is a humanitarian leader and a researcher. As a humanitarian working across the Middle East and Africa, Omar has a wide experience engaging with Islamic non-state armed actors and de facto authorities. He is also a PhD candidate on humanitarian diplomacy in Islamic contexts at the University of Valencia. He has published on protection and humanitarian diplomacy, including most recently in the Journal of Human Rights Practice.
Most conflicts today are non-international, fought between a state and one or more non-state armed groups (NSAGs), or between NSAGs. In this context, engaging with NSAGs and de facto authorities presents a series of challenges to those humanitarian workers who seek to promote international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). Although remarkable normative and practical advances have been achieved, IHL and IHRL continue to be violated.
Novel approaches to promote IHL and IHRL among NSAGs and de facto authorities are thus needed. Over the last few decades efforts have been made to engage not only with those armed actors that are directly involved in conflict but also with other societal actors who might have influence over the warring parties.
This blog post explores whether and to what extent religious leaders (actors affiliated with a certain religion, belief, or spirituality who claim legitimacy to interpret religion and command obedience) can influence NSAGs’ and de facto authorities (non-)compliance with IHL and IHRL. Specifically, the contribution focuses on two religiously inspired movements that have proven relatively inaccessible to humanitarian workers focused on norms-compliance generation – Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in north-western Syria and Ansar Allah in northern Yemen.
The evidence presented here builds on 18 semi-structured interviews conducted with humanitarian practitioners, scholars, analysists, and journalists with expertise on conflict dynamics in Syria and Yemen, as well as religious leaders/ideologues.
Hayat Tahrir al-Sham
Interviews with key informants and reports from knowledgeable observers reveal that HTS has accorded to Salafi religious leaders a certain space for participation. This suggests that Salafi religious leaders have a somewhat active and influential role. Specifically, the most prominent and influential Salafi religious leaders in HTS-controlled areas include current or past members of the group’s Sharia Council and Shura Council; former or current ministers within the HTS-linked Syrian Salvation Government (SSG); respected academics.
As emerged from our interviews, these religious leaders are somewhat influential by virtue of being internal to the political wings of HTS, which involves direct access to decision-making in the area of governance and, possibly, warfare. Moreover, Salafi religious leaders have some degree of influence on HTS due to their scholarly credentials and expertise in matters of sharia. Lastly, many of those Salafi leaders enjoy influence because of the direct and close relationship that they have with HTS’s leader, Muhammad al-Julani, and other prominent figures such as Abdulrahim Atoun or Mazhar al-Wais.
At the same time, it has been noted by respondents inside north-western Syria that the influence of Salafi religious leaders is not absolute but rather exercised within the limits of what is allowed by HTS and its centralized leadership. In other words, even if Salafi religious leaders enjoy some form of participation, they are nonetheless limited in their activities and discourses by HTS’ supreme leadership. Consequently, rather than acting as independent actors, Salafi religious leaders most often use their status and influence to provide justifications in terms of conformity with Sharia to HTS’ policies. As such, while religious leaders do not influence the formulation of the policies, they do influence their implementation.
Much more limited is the influence of Sufi religious leaders, who lack the kind of direct access to the top leadership that Sunni Salafi leaders enjoy. In fact, while Sufi religious leaders have been integrated to some extent by HTS in its governance apparatus as part of its effort to differentiate its image from that of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda and present itself as a quite pragmatic ruler, the doctrinal difference between Sufism and Salafi-Jihadism prevents Sufi leaders from being able to affect HTS’s behaviour.
Data obtained from multiple interviewees have not revealed instances in which influential religious leaders in Idlib have taken a position with respect to the advancement of IHL and IHRL in the ongoing conflict between HTS and the Syrian government. This observation may be regarded as consistent with the leaders’ Salafi-Jihadist ideology, which regards these international legal frameworks as foreign legal constructs that the West has been trying to impose on Islamist armed groups and de facto authorities. Indeed, even though HTS has sought over the past four years to present itself to the international community as a more acceptable political actor, this has not necessarily translated into a greater level of commitment to humanitarian norms. In this regard, a scholar with a deep and direct knowledge with HTS reported that HTS is wary about accepting IHL as this could lead to accusations by its local competitors that it has abandoned Sharia.
Ansar Allah
Interviews with key informants suggest that the most influential religious leaders in Ansar Allah-controlled areas are prominent members of Ansar Allah that fought with the movement already during the Sa’ada wars (2004-2010), members of Ansar Allah’s government structure who also have religious credentials as imams and/or ideologues, and some Zaydi Shia scholars.
As is the case with HTS, religious leaders internal to Ansar Allah’s structure and ideologically aligned to the movement appear to be in positions of some influence. Similarly, interview participants, mostly scholars and religious leaders currently based in southern Yemen or in exile abroad, noted that religious leaders have been unwilling, or unable, to play a positive role when it comes to the promotion and compliance of IHL and IHRL in the confrontation between Ansar Allah and the internationally recognized government in Yemen. However, Zaydi religious leaders have expressed opinions with respect to the conflict with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and condemned IHL violations.
Several interviewees noted that even if Zaydi religious leaders were to encourage compliance with IHL and IHRL, their capacity to influence Ansar Allah’s behaviour is not a certainty. This, as argued by a journalist in northern Yemen with great knowledge of the Houthi movement, is primarily due to Abdulmalik’s position as ‘supreme leader’ which he grounds in divine authority. In effect, Abdulmalik claims a special legitimacy grounded in charisma and tradition whilst uniquely co-founding religious and political leadership, to the point of bearing the title Alam al-Huda (“Icon of Guidance”). As has been noted, this underscores “the sacred nature of Abdulmalik al-Houthi” and places Abdulmalik in a superior position to other religious leaders, even those internal to the movement.
Beyond Abdulmalik himself, other members of the Houthi close circle who can claim direct descent from the Prophet’s family or have another kind of religious credentials (e.g., through education) may be repositories of a certain authority and influence, including in-laws of Abdulmalik and other loyalists appointed by Ansar Allah to prominent roles.
In addition to the claim to legitimate authority to interpret religion, Ansar Allah has also relied on coercive power. They seem to have limited the possibility of independent religious expression in the territories under its control. Key informant interviewees indicated that some Zaydi imams have been removed from their position by Ansar Allah’s leadership and replaced with religious leaders with stronger affinities to the movement. Such developments have further reduced the capacity of religious leaders to raise their voice in favour of respecting IHL and protecting civilians from all sides of the current conflict. This arrangement seems to have de facto prevented religious leaders from exerting any significant influence. Tellingly, the Ministry of Endowment controlled by Ansar Allah provides every imam a sermon to deliver during the Friday prayers. In this tightly controlled context, even those religious leaders who have retained their positions have seen their authority reduced.
Conclusion
Based on the above analysis it appears clear that in relation to HTS and Ansar Allah, religious leaders have been unable to play a significant role as promoters of IHL and IHRL.
Several inter-related reasons seem to account for the observed situation. First, HTS and Ansar Allah have highly centralized organizational structures that limit the space for expression to external religious leaders. Only those who are closely linked to these de facto authorities can exert some degree of influence, within carefully set limits. Second, religious leaders are co-opted by HTS and Ansar Allah in their structures of power and subordinated to tight control. Those religious leaders who escape this co-optation seem to have been marginalized and replaced with loyalists. Third, in the case of HTS, the group’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology poses some challenges in terms of reconcilability with IHL and IHRL. In fact, attempts to recognize existing synergies between Sharia and IHL/IHRL are often dismissed by Salafi-Jihadists as Western attempts to exercise command and control. In the case of Ansar Allah, the supreme leader Abulmalik is considered as the supreme political and religious leader. This reduces considerably the possibility for other religious leaders to speak out and be listened to.
In conclusion, in the specific cases of HTS and Ansar Allah it seems considerably challenging for international humanitarian organizations engaging with religious leaders on IHL and IHRL to achieve greater compliance by these de facto authorities. Nonetheless, humanitarians need to continue engaging with religious leaders and possibly effective proxies to promote knowledge and compliance with IHL and IHRL. For this, it is essential to ensure a deep understanding of the context as well as of Islam and its sharia norms, and the considerable common denominators with IHL and IHRL, seen from different Islamic schools of thought or jurisprudence. In addition, acceptance by the leadership and/or influencers of these movements, patience and a certain dose of creativity is needed.