About the author(s):
Julien Antouly holds a PhD in international law (CEDIN, University of Paris Nanterre). His dissertation focused on regime conflicts between counter-terrorism financing measures and the protection of humanitarian assistance. He has previously served as legal advisor in various humanitarian organizations (ICRC, Norwegian Refugee Council), as well as research program coordinator in France (French Red Cross Foundation) and in Mali (Research Institute for Development).
This post forms part of the Wagner Symposium hosted by the Armed Groups and International Law blog. The introductory post can be found here. The symposium seeks to foster deeper discussion on how best to address the Wagner Group and its affiliated entities.
From their deployment to Mali in late 2021 until their official replacement by Afrika Corps in 2025, the operatives of the Wagner Group have faced repeated allegations of serious violations of international humanitarian law, including acts that may amount to war crimes (see AL MLI 3/2022) and, in some instances, crimes against humanity. The most emblematic case is the 2022 massacre in the village of Moura, where UN sources report that approximately 500 individuals, mostly civilians, were killed over the course of several days, with numerous others subjected to sexual violence. To date, the victims of Moura — as well as those affected by other incidents across Mali — have been systematically denied access to justice, accountability mechanisms, or reparative measures. Regrettably, this situation is far from unique. Over the past decade, victims of mass atrocities throughout the Sahel region have consistently been left without effective legal remedies, irrespective of the identity of the perpetrators. While certain initiatives — such as the establishment of an international commission of inquiry by Algiers Accords and the creation of a Transitional Justice Commission — signaled a degree of progress, impunity remains the prevailing reality rather than the exception.
This post seeks to outline some of the key legal questions surrounding accountability for serious crimes allegedly committed by Wagner Group forces in Mali. In particular, it looks at two specific avenues which have been largely overlooked in the discourse on accountability for Wagner’s conduct: first, domestic prosecution of individual Wagner Group operatives in Mali; second, the state responsibility of Mali before regional and international courts.
The impossibility of prosecuting Wagner crimes in Mali
The prosecution of Wagner-related crimes in Mali faces numerous political and practical challenges, many of which stem from broader issues within the Malian judicial system. However, two particular challenges stand out: first, contrary to other contexts, Wagner’s involvement in counter-terrorism operations in Mali, which effectively shields them from accountability for international crimes; and second, the ambiguous legal status of Wagner personnel in Mali, which depends on the terms of bilateral agreements between Mali and Russia.
i. The legal protections afforded to counter-terrorism operations
Under Malian law, the vast majority of international crimes — namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes — have been incorporated into the national penal code. This incorporation is reflected in both the previous version of the code, which remains applicable until the end of 2024, and the newly adopted code. Both versions contain detailed chapters on international crimes, with definitions largely drawn from the Rome Statute. In 2013, Mali established a Pôle judiciaire spécialisé (Specialized Judicial Unit, hereafter PJS), which, since 2019, has held exclusive jurisdiction over international crimes across the national territory. This institutional development marked a significant step toward improving the prosecution of such crimes.
However, the effective prosecution of international crimes in Mali remains severely limited. Indeed, crimes committed by non-state armed groups are often prosecuted under counter-terrorism legislation rather than as international crimes. In contrast, violations committed by Malian armed forces or affiliated personnel are rarely prosecuted at all. While political considerations partly explain this discrepancy, the problem is also rooted in legal ambiguities. Malian authorities continue to apply the outdated 1995 Code de justice militaire, which grants military courts jurisdiction over common crimes committed by members of the armed forces (Article 16). The structure and procedural rules of military justice, however, fall short of guaranteeing fair trial standards. For instance, under Article 32 of the military code, only the Minister of Defence can initiate proceedings before military courts, unlike in the civilian system, where prosecutors and victims can trigger prosecutions before the PJS.
This overlap and competition between civilian and military jurisdictions remain unresolved, despite the adoption of a new criminal code and an ongoing reform of the Code de justice militaire. A paradigmatic illustration of this jurisdictional confusion is the 2022 Moura massacre. In the immediate aftermath, the military justice system issued a public statement announcing that “following allegations of abuses against civilians, investigations have been opened by the national gendarmerie on the instructions of the Ministry of Defence and Veterans Affairs, in order to shed full light on these allegations.” While this statement appeared to signal a willingness to investigate, it also served to pre-empt the jurisdiction of the PJS. Labeling the military activities as counter-terrorism operations, along with the initiation of an official investigation by military justice, helps justify the lack of jurisdiction of the PJS, whose mandate centers on terrorist and transnational criminal activities. Consequently, over three years later, no official prosecutions have emerged and complaints filed by victims or civil society organizations have failed to trigger any judicial action by the PJS. The Moura case thus highlights how military jurisdiction can be used not only to delay justice but also to prevent independent investigation. Consequently, counter-terrorism operations in Mali, in which Wagner operatives played a direct role, have consistently been shielded from prosecution through the use of military justice — a mechanism that appears to serve as a ‘smokescreen’.
ii. The possible immunities granted to Wagner personnel
One of the most pressing legal challenges in understanding the Wagner military presence in Mali stems from opaque agreements between the Malian government and its Russian counterparts — whether public entities or private military contractors. In late 2021, multiple credible sources reported that Mali had entered into an agreement with the Wagner Group, but its specific content remained confidential. More recently, the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) is believed to have reasserted control over these operations since the death of Prighozin in August 2023, particularly through the establishment of the Afrika Corps. However, the nature of these agreements signed with Mali may effectively prevent any possibility of prosecution before Malian courts.
Like many countries engaged in military cooperation, Russia often signs bilateral defense or technical assistance agreements with host states. The author has reviewed two such agreements between Mali and Russia—one initially signed in 2003 and ratified only recently in 2024, and another from 2019. These documents are generally vague and do not explicitly authorize the deployment of Russian personnel to Mali. The specifics of such deployments would typically be outlined in supplementary technical agreements, which remain inaccessible to independent researchers.
However, analogous cases could shed light on the legal architecture that may be in play. For instance, in 2017, Russia signed a comprehensive agreement with Syria regarding its use of the port of Tartus. These treaties, generally called “Status of Force Agreements” (SOFA), are commonly signed by all countries sending military personnel abroad, such as the USA or France, to provide them with immunity, among other issues. Article 1 of that Treaty, accessed by the author, defines “personnel” as both military and civilian citizens of the Russian Federation assigned to the facility. It also includes “contractors” registered in Russia and providing logistical services. Notably, Article 9 of that agreement grants sweeping immunities to all these individuals — protecting them from civil, administrative, and criminal jurisdiction in Syria. Furthermore, it clarifies that Russia retains full jurisdiction over its contractors who are Russian citizens and accused of committing crimes. Given this precedent, it is plausible that similar legal protections are afforded to Russian operatives — whether private or state-affiliated — currently active in Mali. Consequently, personnel of the Wagner Group — and now the Afrika Corps — may be shielded from any form of domestic legal action under Malian jurisdiction. Even in the event of a regime change in Mali, these agreements could pose a significant obstacle to future prosecutions.
Exploring the possibility to engage the international responsibility of the Malian State
As domestic prosecution is very unlikely, due to political and legal reasons as explained above, one must turn to international legal avenues for accountability for crimes committed by Wagner group in Mali. A lot of attention has been paid to the possibility of engaging the responsibility of Russian State. However, few analyses have explored the possibility of holding the Malian state accountable and initiating proceedings before regional or international courts. This is highly concerning for two key reasons. Politically, it risks denying the agency of Malian leaders and institutions — and thus their responsibility — in the decision to engage Wagner and involve its personnel in daily counter-terrorism operations. Legally, proceedings that exclude the Malian state and focus solely on Russia or Wagner officials could, in effect, sideline the victims — most of whom are Malian. To address this gap, the second part of this post will explore two specific avenues: the possibility of initiating proceedings before African and international jurisdictions.
i. The potential role of regional African courts
In a purely legal reflection, the most appropriate forum to hold the Malian State legally accountable for the activities of the Wagner Group on its territory would be the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court of Justice. This is because the Court has jurisdiction over any human rights violations committed within the territories of its Member States and allows individuals or NGOs to file complaints directly, notably without requiring the exhaustion of local remedies for admissibility. However, Mali, within the context of the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States in 2024 with Niger and Burkina Faso, decided to withdraw from ECOWAS and consequently from the Court’s jurisdiction. Legally, the Court could still exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed prior to the effective withdrawal date (January 2025, one year after the announcement). Nevertheless, the prospects for meaningful proceedings under this avenue appear limited as it is unlikely to see Mali cooperate with the Court and respect its decisions.
In contrast, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR), established by a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, represents the most likely and effective forum for seeking accountability for Wagner-related crimes in Mali. Mali is one of 34 Member States that have ratified this Protocol. Regarding admissibility, the Protocol allows States to make a special declaration accepting the Court’s jurisdiction to receive applications submitted directly by individuals and NGOs. Mali is among the eight States that have made such a declaration. Historically, both NGOs and individuals have successfully brought cases before the Court alleging violations of the Charter by the Malian State.
Concerning jurisdiction, victims of abuses linked to the Wagner Group could invoke several provisions of the Charter, including the right to life, the prohibition of torture, and protection against arbitrary arrest and detention. Moreover, beyond direct violations committed with the complicity or under the direction of the Malian armed forces, violations perpetrated solely by private mercenaries could also fall within the Court’s remit. This approach finds precedent in a case brought before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) — which handles individual complaints when States have not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction for direct applications. In that case, NGOs and individuals accused the military forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) of creating an insecure environment during their retreat from Goma to Minova. They alleged that the army’s failure to protect civilians, coupled with its direct responsibility for grave and widespread abuses, left the population vulnerable to barbaric acts by the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). The Commission held the DRC accountable for leaving the population “at the mercy” of these acts, failing to protect civilians and itself perpetrating violations (§125). This reasoning could be applied to the Malian context, potentially holding the State responsible not only for actions directly committed by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) but also for “leaving the population at the mercy” of abuses committed by Wagner operatives.
ii. The prospect of referring a case to the International Court of Justice
A final potential avenue for legal action could involve holding the Malian State accountable before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Bearing in mind jurisdictional factors in bringing cases before the ICJ, one of the only viable legal bases could be the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT). Mali has ratified this Convention without reservations, thereby accepting the ICJ’s jurisdiction over disputes concerning its interpretation and application which cannot be resolved through negotiation or arbitration (Art 24(1)). In a recent case, Ukraine filed an application against the Russian Federation, alleging violations of the ICSFT. Ukraine claimed that Russia failed to take necessary measures to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism financing, particularly concerning armed activities in eastern Ukraine attributed to groups associated with the self-proclaimed “Donetsk People’s Republic” and “Luhansk People’s Republic”.
Regarding Wagner activities in Mali, three key legal questions must be addressed. First, it is crucial to determine whether Wagner’s activities can be classified as terrorist acts within the meaning of the relevant Convention. In this context, the fact that Wagner is sanctioned by various States and regional organizations is not relevant. On one hand, Wagner is not listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations or the European Union. On the other hand, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has clearly stated that “the characterization by a single State of an organization or a group as ‘terrorist’ is insufficient” (§64). Instead, the focus should be on the nature of Wagner’s actions rather than the organization’s label or designation. Indeed, the ICSFT defines terrorist acts as including those already criminalized in various UN anti-terrorism conventions, such as explosive bombings or attacks targeting civil aviation. It also encompasses “any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (Article 2 of the Convention). Applying this latter definition, Wagner’s activities in Mali could clearly fall within its scope, as many of their operations, such as in Moura, appear aimed at causing death among civilians with the intent to intimidate the population.
Second, it is essential to determine whether Mali violated provisions of the Convention by funding the Wagner group. In the Ukraine-Russia case, the ICJ examined whether the ICSFT covers state-sponsored financing of terrorism. The Court clarified that the Convention applies broadly to all individuals, including state agents, without excluding any category of persons. However, it emphasized that the ICSFT primarily addresses the criminal liability of individuals involved in financing terrorism and does not, by itself, establish state responsibility solely based on the actions of its agents. Nevertheless, States Parties to the ICSFT are obligated to take necessary measures and cooperate to prevent and suppress terrorism financing committed by any person, including state representatives. Such acts are defined as the provision or collection of funds with the intention or knowledge that they will be used to finance terrorist activities. In this context, press reports have documented the responsibility of various Malian leaders — including members of the junta and the State Security services — in providing funds and payments to the Wagner Group.
The third and final question concerns the identification of another State Party to the ICSFT that has been directly affected by acts committed by Wagner operatives. In the Ukraine-Russia case, the Court found that Russia violated the Convention by failing to respond to Ukraine’s formal requests and by refusing to initiate domestic investigations and prosecutions of individuals involved in financing terrorism. This obligation is not erga omnes, meaning a State must demonstrate a specific legal interest (jus standi), as Ukraine did in that case. Therefore, a third State would need to formally request that Malian authorities investigate and prosecute those responsible for financing terrorist acts committed by Wagner operatives that have impacted its territory or nationals. Some neighboring states of Mali, such as Mauritania, have been directly affected by Wagner’s activities on their territory or against their nationals and have publicly expressed their frustration. However, it remains unlikely that they will formally bring claims at this stage, as the Malian government has sought to resolve these disputes through direct agreements and by providing compensation to the victims.
Conclusion
This brief blog post highlighted the significant obstacles faced by victims of Wagner Group crimes in Mali in their pursuit of accountability and reparations. Indeed, impunity remains widespread in the Sahel region due to a range of political and legal factors. However, some narrow but viable avenues have been identified, particularly concerning the international responsibility of the Malian State. While implementing these measures presents considerable challenges and may not fully satisfy the justice needs of all victims, they could nonetheless lay the groundwork for future paths toward justice. In this regard, establishing a Commission of Inquiry on the Wagner Group could serve as an initial step and would undoubtedly support future national, regional, and international efforts to ensure accountability for Wagner’s crimes in the Sahel region.