About the author(s):
Zawadi Gasindikira Jaël is a researcher at War Child Alliance DRCongo within the Beyond Compliance Consortium program, where she serves as the Country Research Unit Lead. Specializing in child protection, she has expertise in children’s rights, with a particular focus on the right to education, and issues related to children and armed conflict. She is currently a PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of the University of Burundi, where her doctoral research examines the dynamics and impacts of armed conflict on children’s education in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including children associated with armed forces and armed groups.
This post forms part of phase two of the Beyond Compliance Symposium: How to Prevent Harm and Need in Conflict, hosted by the Armed Groups and International Law blog. The introductory post can be found here. The symposium invites reflection on the conceptualisation of negative everyday lived experiences of armed conflict, and legal and extra-legal strategies that can effectively address both civilian harm and humanitarian need.
Introduction: Contextual and analytical framework
According to the United Nations (UN), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is one of the countries in the world with very high levels of cases of recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. For the year 2024 alone, the UN documented 2,365 cases of recruitment and use of children (1,651 boys and 714 girls) in the DRC. Among the perpetrators, armed groups are the leading group (approximately 98%) followed by regular forces (approximately 2%). The fact that this phenomenon is occurring within a context marked by several decades of non-international armed conflicts, especially in the eastern part of the country, underscores the importance of analysing it through the lens of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), which constitutes the minimum criteria for assessing the conduct of armed actors. However, while IHL and human rights frameworks remain essential for prohibiting the recruitment and use of children in conflict, they alone cannot fully capture the realities experienced by affected children or account for the forms of harm that extend beyond strictly legal definitions. Nor do they account for the needs that give rise to or result from these experiences. Therefore, it is relevant to integrate the Beyond Compliance approach in order to move beyond the law, which will not only allow for a more nuanced understanding of the experiences of recruited children and their communities, but will also potentially pave the way for more context-specific response strategies.
This article proposes to explore the recruitment of child soldiers in the DRC in its complexity, at the limits of classic legal frameworks and to examine the intergenerational norms that influence the place of young people within local dynamics of militarisation.
The multiple dimensions of harm: visible and invisible effects of the recruitment of child soldiers in the DRC
In its narrowest sense, the term “harm” is often used with the adjective “civilian” to describe the negative effects of the use of force on civilians during hostilities. However, even when armed, child soldiers are vulnerable combatants and are entitled to special protection under IHL, because their age and limited agency make them susceptible to harm both within or outside armed groups.
In the DRC, in addition to abductions, recruited children are victims of murder, mutilations, war wounds, physical abuse, torture, arduous forced labour, drug use and addiction, and high vulnerability to disease and malnutrition. The violations they suffer are intersectional and are compounded by their pre-existing vulnerabilities. While children of both sexes can all be victims of sexual violence in armed groups, approximately 95% of verified cases of sexual violence in the DRC involve girls. Girls are thus subjected to rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriages with their recruiters and peers, with risks of early and unwanted pregnancies, Sexually Transmitted Infections and Sexually Transmitted Diseases.
Beyond the visible and physical effects, the exposure of children to and perpetration of violent acts as members of armed groups in the DRC, can lead to mental health consequences. They exhibit high levels of trauma, post-traumatic stress disorder, and criminal, violent and repetitive aggressive behaviours. The psychological impact is felt long after a child’s recruitment and reverberates across borders, affecting communities that have lost their children and fearing further violence. The recruitment of children into armed groups in the DRC has been identified as a predisposing factor for antisocial behaviour and juvenile delinquency.
In DRC, children are forced by their communities to join armed groups to protect their families. This transforms social relationships into instruments of coercion. Thus, recruitment tears apart the social fabric by pushing children to abandon school, community, and family. It also amplifies conflicts, perpetuating violence by instilling in young recruits narratives of collective loss, victimisation, injustice, toxic masculinity, and ethnic territorial claims. Similarly, former child soldiers face difficult social reintegration experiences because, once back in the community, they encounter discrimination, exclusion, and stigmatisation. Recruitment is also a system that perpetuates gendered social roles by associating girls with support functions such as cooks, porters, messengers, spies, translators, nurses or wives within armed groups.
The cultural dimensions of harm reveal how war is sometimes a continuation of a spiritual and traditional order, which socially legitimises the involvement of children. In some armed groups in the DRC, children are perceived as possessing spiritual powers, thus culturally exposing them to a “sacred” or “ritualistic” role in the war. Young people are also drawn to armed groups as a way to rebuild an identity and belong to a “warrior group.” Some armed groups exploit traditional, identity-based, or cultural narratives to recruit children, relying on cultural, ideological, and religious dynamics in a context where the conflict alters traditional cultural norms. The recruitment of child soldiers represents a break in historical continuity. While in African cultures, the integration of children into warfare was not historically the norm, this phenomenon is gradually becoming normalised in certain conflict contexts in the DRC, which has destructive effects on intergenerational values, socialisation and the culture of peace.
From an economic perspective, recruited children find themselves in a situation of lost schooling, persistent poverty, and a lack of opportunities, exposing them to economic vulnerability in both the short and long term. Furthermore, it should be noted that some armed groups prefer to use children in war because they constitute a cheap and easily exploitable labour force. There is thus a generation forced to fight rather than study, create businesses, or build economic resources.
Intergenerational needs, norms, and trauma
Poverty is a major factor leading to the ongoing recruitment of child soldiers in the DRC, as the country was the poorest in the world for 2024. For children from disadvantaged backgrounds and families, the guarantee of subsistence by an armed group increases the risk of recruitment. A dynamic then emerges where the needs of children and their communities resonate with the incentives offered by armed groups (promises of wages, free schooling, spoils of war, a “better life”, protection), proving particularly persuasive and leading to recruitment and then the harm described above. The so-called “voluntary” recruitment of children into armed groups is merely an illusion: in situations where children have no other choice, they cannot meaningfully consent. In many cases, children are motivated by the need for food, shelter, and protection.
The pressures on children extend beyond survival needs, as armed conflict has become a “way of life” in the DRC. Children are subjected to pressure from their families and peers to join armed groups. Beyond economic motives, this pressure is often fueled by promises of revenge and protection for the family or community. The daily reality of armed violence in the DRC has created intergenerational trauma, manifesting in the psychological impacts described earlier. Furthermore, patterns of violent behaviour are perpetuated, affecting the social and emotional development of new generations. The difficulties faced by former child soldiers in reintegrating into society, often rejected by their communities due to the stigma associated with the acts committed or suffered, create dynamics of shame and isolation that are passed down to their descendants. All these elements promote a cultural transmission of trauma which translates into stories of violence, constant fear and insecurity which become an integral part of the collective identity and are unconsciously transmitted, shaping the worldview of the youngest members of the society.
Legal frameworks, responses and challenges to child recruitment in the DRC
The DRC has a robust national legal framework prohibiting the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict (Article 71 of the Law on the Protection of the Child, Article 7 of the Law on the Organization of Defense and the FARDC). Similarly, the country has ratified several international treaties under IHRL, protecting children against recruitment and use within armed forces and groups at all times (Articles 32 and 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, Articles 1, 2,4 of the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, and Article 3(a) of the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour). In addition, several IHL instruments applicable in the DRC -both in international and non-international conflicts- prohibit the participation of children in hostilities (Article 77 §2 of the Additional Protocol (I) & Article 4, § 3(c) of the Additional Protocol (II) to the Geneva Conventions; Article 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Rome Statute, and Rule 136 of customary international humanitarian law).
Beyond these legal and regulatory commitments, DRC has implemented a set of mechanisms, including the 2012 Action Plan to end the recruitment of children. The Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration (DDRC) process has also evolved from an institutional system focused on individual demobilisation (National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration & National Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program) to a more comprehensive, community-based, and stabilising approach (Disarmament, Demobilization, Community Recovery, and Stabilization Program). These mechanisms are also integrated into the programs and activities of some INGOs. In addition to the DDR process, the response implemented in DRC also relies on monitoring mechanisms (Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism / Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting), prevention procedures within the regular forces, community-based prevention initiatives, and socio-economic reintegration programs coordinated between the State, the UN, and NGOs.
However, there is a gap between policy and implementation, due to the lack of sanctions against recruiters. This is compounded by weak international and local accountability: international sanction mechanisms are limited, and local justice systems often lack the resources to investigate and prosecute. Regarding program effectiveness, geographical coverage remains limited, and programs struggle to operate in highly insecure areas. Limitations also include insufficient resources, unstable funding and insufficient for DDR and the dependence on international partners (UN/UNICEF/NGOs). Thus, reintegration is incomplete and inadequate, sometimes pushing demobilised children to return to armed groups. It should also be noted that community awareness remains limited, despite existing local campaigns and committees.
The problem is also complicated by the ambiguity surrounding the minimum age for recruitment and participation in hostilities. While the Rome Statute criminalises the recruitment of children under 15 years of age, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child sets the age limit for conscription and direct participation in hostilities at 18. This practically means that while armed armed groups are prohibited from recruiting 16-17 years old children, their conduct would not be prosecuted as a war crime under the Rome Statute, as it sets a lower threshold, that of 15 years old. Nevertheless, these cases could still be prosecuted under domestic law. The issue of age extends beyond the legal framework. While the law protecting children in DRC defines a child as any person under the age of 18, African perceptions and local practices often redefine who is considered an “adult” and these social reconfigurations, combined with the precariousness, provide recruiters with pretexts for enlisting minors.
Dynamics of compliance and restraint
Regarding compliance, the armed forces of DRC continue to implement the 2012 Action Plan by verifying age during the recruitment process. Furthermore, in 2023, they adopted the military code of conduct, incorporating child protection. For their part, some armed groups have signed the Deed of Commitment under Geneva Call for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict, and have sometimes amended their code of war and conduct to improve their compliance with international law. Among the factors promoting compliance, international pressure and legal obligations play a role, as does monitoring by MRM/CTFMR. Some groups also comply in pursuit of political and diplomatic advantages, in order to negotiate peace agreements or gain legitimacy. In some cases, awareness-raising, training, and contact with humanitarian partners also help reduce child recruitment.
Regarding restraint, formal military structures generally demonstrate greater restraint from recruitment and use than militias, as the latter exhibit partial and contextual restraint, in response to international pressure. Strategic, community, and ideological factors can also lead them to exercise restraint. For example, some armed groups refrain from overly visible recruitment to avoid uprisings or a loss of support among the population, especially in the territories they control. Spiritual, mystical, or cultural considerations, sometimes influenced by traditional and religious leaders, can also play a role in restraint. However, these dynamics remain localised and constitute a double-edged sword, given the cultural harms previously outlined.
Conclusion: Breaking intergenerational norms
The harm suffered by children recruited in armed conflicts in the DRC stems not only from individual trauma but also from a set of intergenerational norms that, by legitimising violence and valuing membership in armed groups, perpetuate the cycle of recruitment. Breaking with these norms requires going beyond traditional interventions focused on demobilisation; it involves a deeper transformation of community perceptions, family practices, and the socio-economic conditions that foster the reproduction of this phenomenon.
Future approaches should therefore prioritise longitudinal and community-based research capable of documenting the mechanisms of norm transmission and identifying the cultural, educational, and institutional levers that can bring about lasting change. In the short term, it is recommended to strengthen the link between compliance mechanisms and community restraint initiatives to achieve full(er) protection in war. It is also important to systematically involve local leaders in transforming social norms, to invest in education and child protection, and to strengthen the enforcement of existing legal frameworks to create an environment where child recruitment is no longer tolerated, normalised, or perceived as a survival strategy.