About the author(s):
Dr. Omar Ahmed Abenza is the Director of Programs at the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), where he oversees the organization’s global programmatic portfolio across Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia. He has 20 years of experience working in conflict-affected environments, leading humanitarian, protection of civilians, humanitarian diplomacy, and peacebuilding initiatives with international NGOs, governments, and multilateral organizations.
Prior to joining CIVIC, Omar served as Head of Africa at Geneva Call, having previously managed its Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America programs. Earlier in his career, he spent a decade with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in a range of operational and leadership roles, and later served on the organization’s Board of Directors. He has also worked with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as with several international organizations and UN agencies, including IOM and UNDP.
Dr. Abenza holds a PhD from the University of Valencia, where his research focused on humanitarian diplomacy in Islamic contexts. He also holds a BA in Economics from the University of Valencia and the University of Nantes, and an MA in Global Diplomacy from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.
His areas of expertise include the Protection of Civilians, International Humanitarian Law, humanitarian diplomacy, civilian harm mitigation, engagement with armed actors, and the evolving impact of conflict on civilian populations.
Álvaro Mellado Domínguez is a humanitarian practitioner and PhD candidate in International Relations and Communication at Blanquerna – Ramon Llull University (Barcelona, Spain), where he is a member of the GLOBALCODES research group. Since 2005, he has worked in humanitarian operations with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Médecins du Monde (MdM), undertaking assignments across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, including Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Cameroon, Colombia, and Venezuela.
He holds a BA (Hons) in International Relations from London Metropolitan University, an MA in Conflict, Security and Development from the University of Bradford, a Nursing Degree from the University of Málaga, and a Diploma in Tropical Nursing from the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine. His research focuses on humanitarian space, humanitarian diplomacy, humanitarian negotiations, protection of civilians, and the interaction between humanitarian actors, armed groups, and civilian populations in contexts of armed conflict.
The current conflict in Sudan represents one of the most severe protection of civilians crises in the world. Since 2023, more than 12 million people have been displaced, while humanitarian needs continue to grow in a context of restricted access, institutional fragmentation, and the erosion of basic services. Yet the scale of civilian harm cannot be understood as a recent development alone. Rather, it reflects more than two decades of unresolved challenges in translating international humanitarian law (IHL) into effective protection on the ground.
While the current war shares important features with previous conflicts in Sudan—particularly the war in Darfur that began in 2003—such as widespread violence against civilians, the use of non-state armed actors linked to central power structures, and the instrumentalization of ethnic identities, it also presents distinct characteristics that increase its complexity from a civilian protection perspective.
First, the nature of the conflict has shifted. Unlike previous centre–periphery dynamics, the current war is a direct contest for control of the state between the Sudanese Armed Forces, as the incumbent state military, and the Rapid Support Forces, a paramilitary actor that was previously integrated within the national security apparatus. Second, the geographic spread of violence across much of the country, including densely populated urban centres such as Khartoum and El Fasher, has significantly reduced the availability of safe spaces for civilians. Whereas in earlier phases of conflict displacement to urban areas could offer relative protection, the presence of hostilities in densely populated environments has increased the risk of civilian casualties, damage to critical infrastructure, and disruption of essential services.
Third, the collapse of the political transition following the 2019 revolution has deepened institutional fragmentation and eroded public trust in authorities, weakening formal protection mechanisms. These mechanisms typically rely on the effective application of laws within a functioning rule of law system, security forces maintenance of public order and civilians safety, and the existence of a civic space and community structures that support everyday protection. Finally, the conflict reflects the growing relevance of technologies such as drones, electronic interference, and control of telecommunications, which shape both military operations and civilian risk, while – at the same time – enabling new forms of independent documentation of violations by open?source investigators such as the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, and the Centre for Information Resilience, and Bellingcat.
In this context of heightened civilian vulnerability, reducing risks to civilians requires strengthening respect for IHL in practice, reinforcing institutional and community-based protection mechanisms, and enabling forms of dialogue that can help mitigate harm.
Promoting respect for IHL in practice
Strengthening respect for IHL requires a pragmatic approach that recognizes the need to maintain dialogue with all parties to the conflict, including state armed forces, non-state armed groups, and civilian authorities. While IHL provides a clear normative framework—including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack—its impact ultimately depends on how these obligations are interpreted, internalized, and applied in operational settings.
In the case of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), technical engagement on protection of civilians can contribute to improving operational predictability, reducing incidental harm, and facilitating humanitarian access. For such engagement to influence behaviour, it must extend beyond senior leadership to include mid-level officers and field commanders, who are responsible for operational decisions affecting civilians. Experience from other contexts suggests that training on protection of civilians, clearer command responsibility, and the integration of civilian harm considerations into operational planning – and eventually policies – can help reduce risks, particularly in urban warfare environments.
In this context, approaches to civilian harm mitigation—including the systematic identification, tracking, and analysis of civilian harm (civilian harm tracking tools and mechanisms) —can help armed actors better understand patterns of risk and adjust their operational practices accordingly.
This approach is equally relevant in relation to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and other non-state armed actors, whose decentralized structures often present additional challenges in terms of command and control. Although dialogue with such actors raises political and ethical concerns, their direct influence on civilian safety makes it necessary to explore avenues for communication that can reduce harm and promote awareness of IHL obligations.
Strengthening institutional and community-based protection
In parallel to engagement with armed actors, there is a need to strengthen institutional capacities related to protection of civilians. As a state actor with legal responsibilities under IHL, the SAF has the potential to contribute to the development of mechanisms aimed at reducing harm to civilians. The existence of internal structures related to civilian protection—such as the interministerial Protection of Civilians (PoC) committee—provides a concrete entry point to progressively embed protection considerations within state authorities. While such mechanisms remain limited in their ability to translate commitments into consistent operational practice, they offer a basis upon which more systematic approaches could be developed, including clearer procedures, improved coordination, and stronger accountability frameworks.
At the same time, protection of civilians in Sudan cannot rely solely on formal state or international mechanisms such as legal and policy frameworks, peacekeeping mandates, or centralized institutional protection structures. The conflict has highlighted the critical role of community-based protection and resilience mechanisms that have enabled populations to cope with high levels of uncertainty and violence. Local mediation initiatives and grassroots peace efforts—documented in UNDP’s Bridging Divides: Local Peace Initiatives in Sudan—have contributed to reducing tensions and sustaining basic levels of social cohesion in conflict-affected areas.
Similarly, informal solidarity networks have played an essential role in maintaining basic support systems. Among these, the Emergency Response Rooms (ERR) have emerged as particularly significant community-led structures, providing assistance, identifying immediate risks, and sharing life-saving information. Their local legitimacy, contextual knowledge, and rapid mobilization capacity have enabled them to operate where access for other actors remains limited.
Supporting such community-based structures also helps address the longstanding gap in trust between communities, authorities, and armed actors. Local leaders, religious figures, and other socially legitimate actors can act as intermediaries, facilitating communication, reducing tensions, and promoting behaviour that contributes to civilian protection. The role of women in these processes is particularly important, as they often sustain community networks and social cohesion. As highlighted by ODI/HPG in Refocusing Protection on Reducing Risks of Violence (2025), effective protection strategies must be grounded in the perceptions, priorities, and self-protection practices of affected communities.
Enabling communication to reduce civilian harm
Community structures also play a role in reducing the deep mistrust that has long characterized relations between society and security actors in Sudan. In contexts where formal communication channels are weak or absent, trusted local actors can help convey information about risks, needs, and local dynamics in ways that reduce misunderstandings.
Establishing even limited channels of communication between communities, civilian authorities, and parties to the conflict can help anticipate risks, prevent incidents, and reduce the likelihood of harm to civilians. Such communication does not require political recognition, but can function as a practical tool to improve awareness and influence behaviour.
At the same time, dialogue with parties to the conflict carries risks. It may be perceived as conferring legitimacy or may be instrumentalized without leading to meaningful changes in conduct. It can also generate perceptions of bias, particularly in polarized environments. For this reason, any engagement must be guided by clear principles, including transparency, consistency with humanitarian norms, ongoing risk analysis, and accountability to affected populations.
Despite these risks, the absence of communication often increases uncertainty and the likelihood of harm. Carefully designed forms of engagement—particularly those rooted in community structures—can contribute to greater predictability and create space for incremental improvements in protection.
Conclusion
Improving protection of civilians in Sudan requires more than reaffirming legal obligations. It demands sustained efforts to translate those obligations into operational practice through dialogue with parties to the conflict, strengthened institutional capacities, and locally grounded approaches. The current crisis illustrates the limits of normative frameworks when not supported by functioning institutions, communication channels, and incentives for behavioural change.
In this regard, existing institutional platforms—such as the interministerial Protection of Civilians (PoC) committee—offer a potential entry point to progressively embed protection considerations within state structures. While such mechanisms remain limited in their current effectiveness, their further development could contribute to greater coherence, accountability, and predictability in how protection is addressed in practice.
While the challenges are significant, the presence of institutional entry points, community-based protection mechanisms, and opportunities for pragmatic dialogue suggests that progress remains possible. Strengthening these elements, even incrementally, can contribute to reducing immediate risks and laying the foundations for more sustainable protection outcomes.