About the author(s):
Yiokasti Mouratidi is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of International and Operational Law at the Swedish Defence University, jointly with the Faculty of Law, Economics and Governance at Utrecht University. Her PhD focuses on compliance with the law of armed conflict, particularly through the lens of technological developments. Previously, Yiokasti obtained her LLM in Public International Law from Utrecht University (2022) and her LLB in Law with European Law from the University of Nottingham (2019). Yiokasti has a strong interest in international humanitarian law and international security law.

Image: East African Court of Justice, EAC Headquarters
On 27 September 2024, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) presented its case against the Republic of Rwanda (Rwanda) before the East African Court of Justice (the Court), the judicial organ of the East African Community (EAC). According to the Court’s press release, the DRC’s application accuses Rwanda of acts of aggression in violation of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, political stability and independence; it further argues that Rwanda’s conduct has led to significant human rights violations on its territory.
At present, there is limited publicly available information relating to the timeframe and details of the accused conduct that the DRC is specifically relying on, though some press coverage reports it pertains to the past 25 years of insecurity within the eastern DRC. Now, the case comes at a time of heightened instability and armed clashes in eastern DRC, with over 200 rebel groups reportedly present in the mineral-rich region; the resurgence of the rebel group M23 since 2022 has seen it spread its control over embattled territories. Rwanda has long been accused of supporting M23 and faced with diplomatic calls to cease such support, which it has denied. Earlier this year, legal analysis by Martha Bradley and Marko Svicevic suggested the conflict may have already become of an international character between the DRC and Rwanda, by applying the test for overall control found in Tadic.
Latest Report of the UN Groups of Experts: Rwanda’s “de facto control and direction” over M23
The proceedings before the Court come soon after the publication of the Report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC in early July 2024. For present purposes, the report’s key findings pertaining to Rwanda’s involvement with M23 through the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) are as follows (paras 40-45):
- Evidence confirming “systematic border incursions” by RDF into the DRC’s territory, at Petit Nord, directly engaging in front-line combat and operating high-tech weaponry alongside M23. RDF’s presence was “critical” in repelling the DRC’s forces and occupying new territory in Petit Nord.
- Further border incursions and deployment to key military positions which enabled taking and maintaining control of new territory: a village, Shasha, jointly with M23; three vacated MONUSCO positions by RDF; areas north, west and south of Sake, together with M23 and under the command of sanctioned individuals.
- The arrival and occupation of RDF troops in Rwindi, subsequently joined by M23, leading to the retreat of the DRC’s forces and thereby enabling M23 to take more territory under its control.
- Overall, RDF provided “critical” interventions and operations that enabled the “impressive” territorial expansion of M23 in January to March 2024. M23’s ability to operate on several axes and battlefields at once was dependent on RDF’s military and strategic support.
The section regarding RDF’s support to M23 concludes with the remarks that Rwanda provided “systematic support and presence” and the deployment of its forces on the DRC’s territory constituted a violation of the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the DRC. Finally, it noted that “de facto control and direction over M23 operations also renders Rwanda liable for the actions of M23”.
While previous UN Expert reports have also set out Rwanda’s support for M23, the above findings have been the most unequivocal to date, seemingly extending as far as noting Rwanda’s liability for M23’s violations of international law. Rwanda has also shifted from outright denial of the accusations as to its involvement, with representatives framing their position as a matter of self-defence; in response to the ongoing proceedings, the Rwandan Foreign Minister noted the DRC’s pretence of “giving lessons on justice”, when at the same time its own forces and allied armed groups are also perpetrating grave violations of international law (also set out within the report). Nonetheless, press coverage of the current proceedings suggests that the DRC is relying on these UN reports before the Court.
Rwanda’s objections
According to the Court’s press release, Rwanda presented two arguments to persuade the Court to strike out the case. First, on a point of procedure, it asserted that the DRC failed to submit all aspects of its case in English, the official language of the EAC and the Court. Second, it argued that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the conduct complained of occurred prior to the DRC’s entry to the EAC (July 2022).
What next?
The Court must now determine how to proceed with the case in light of Rwanda’s procedural and jurisdictional objections. Moreover, this is seemingly the first case of its kind to reach the Court: according to its press release, it is the first time a state is bringing a case against another state for infringement of a provision of the EAC establishing Treaty. Reviewing the Court’s past case list also suggests it has not previously dealt with proceedings pertaining to armed conflicts. In this regard, it is presently unclear, on the basis of publicly available information, exactly which provisions of the Treaty the DRC is accusing Rwanda of violating, though a number of Articles pertain to the maintenance of “good neighbourliness” and the promotion of peace and security within the Community (for example, Article 124). Should the proceedings progress to a substantive stage, this will therefore be novel ground for the Court in adjudicating interstate disputes on matters of peace and security. Finally, the Court has wide-ranging options of orders and judgments at its disposal, including for damages and injunctions.
Even so, it remains to be seen whether the proceedings will have any tangible impact on the warring parties, amidst a worsening humanitarian crisis for displaced civilians and ongoing violations of international humanitarian law by all parties to the conflict. Against this background, the case may be nothing more but emblematic of a lawfare strategy by the DRC against Rwanda, particularly given reports that it threatened to leave the EAC should the Court not consider its application.